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IComplex Product Design Litigation: A
Need for More Capable Fact-Finders
BY ORA FRED HARRIS, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Tort law, including the law of products liability, has significant
common law underpinnings.' As a result, it is a creation of juries
and judges. 2 Tort law is extremely fluid because liability rules are
generally developed in relation to existing societal conditions.3
Consequently, tort liability is indeterminate because it tends to
vary with the political, economic, and social demands of the
particular time and place.4
* Professor of Law, Umversity of Inliis. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1973, Umversity of
Arkansas at Fayetteville.
Little, On Teaching Torts, MB. L. Scl. REP., Jan. 1986, at 1 ("Morts retains
more common law flavor than most courses, "). However, there have been recent
legislative infringements upon the common law domain, "particularly in comparative
negligence, workers' compensation and no-fault automobile reparation statutes. " Id.
In products liability, for instance, the major statutory component is the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which governs the law of contract warranties. W KEaroN, D. OWEN, J.
MoNraomERY, & M. GREEN, PRODUCTS LAI~TrrY AN SAFETY 15 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
W KEETON].
2 Little, supra note 1, at 1 ("In the law of torts most of this evolution has occurred
by common law process. ").
3 See SPEECH BY RIcHARD EPsmsiN, (March 1989) (AALS Torts Law Workshop).
Professor Richard Epstein maintains that the most significant problem attending products
liability today is its extreme indeterminacy. See also Huber, Insurance, Not Lawsuits, for
the Accident Prone, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1988, at 24, col. 3 (lamenting the inefficiency
spawned by the "infinitely fluid" nature of the tort litigation process).
4 A prime example of the rapidly changing nature of products liability law in view
of existing societal conditions is its evolution from the industrial revolution of the 19th
century to the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916),
where the privity of contract duty limitation was abolished in negligence products cases.
Prior to MacPherson, tort law basically was used to subsidize industry by erecting artificial
barriers to recoveries, such as caveat emptor and privity. When industry was conceivably
no longer in a nascent state, the notion that the risk of loss should fall on the consumer
was discarded m favor of raising consumer protection and safety to a higher plane.
MacPherson represented a clear shift in this policy direction. See Gregory, Trespass to
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rnv. 359 (1951). But see Schwartz, The
Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REv. 641 (1989) (challenging
conventional thinking that nineteenth century tort law was used to promote industrial
growth at the expense of individual safety).
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As society becomes more sophisticated, products liability liti-
gation inevitably will become more complex. This is certainly true
of complex product design litigation, which may be defined gen-
erally as those product design cases involving extraordinary com-
plex factual and legal issues. Much product design litigation today
involves intricate issues, and highly technical questions attending
such litigation are routinely decided as questions of fact by a jury 5
Do these questions surpass the practical understanding and capac-
ity of conventional fact-finders?6 If so, should radical changes be
made to insure that the fact-finding process remains impartial and
rational?7
This Article initially addresses the constitutional and practical
foundations of the right to jury trial in civil litigation in the United
States. Then the focus of this Article shifts to the means available
to alter the right to jury trial when warranted by compelling policy
notions underlying the administration of civil justice. Several al-
ternative mechamsms are examined to determine whether, in com-
plex design litigation, the net benefits of such changes justify some
deviation from the existing jury system. The primary objective of
this Article is to ascertain whether the proposed alternatives will
render the adjudication of complex design cases more rational,
fair, and efficient without transgressing federal and state jury trial
guarantees.
I See J. PILuPS, PRODUCTS LiBnuTY IN A NUTsHELL 191 (3d ed. 1988). Design
cases are so complex that expert testimony is invariably required to shed light on the highly
techmcal issues involved, most notably the feasibility of a safer, alternative design. In this
vein, Professor Phillips notes that "[s]ome courts and commentators are concerned about
the propriety of submitting complex design issues to a jury that lacks the kind of expert
knowledge thought necessary to judge such issues." Id.
I Conventional fact-finders are typically lay people selected from the community to
resolve factual disputes arising in civil trials. The apparent virtue of this selection process
is that such a body may represent, in some fanciful way, the conscience of the community.
Another fundamental concern is that a jury should represent a cross-section of the com-
munity. Crook, The Seventh Amendment: Priceless Heritage, 16 COLO. LAw 1594, 1599
(1987).
. Due process mandates that a fact-finder's deternnation be impartial and rational.
Note, Court-Sanctioned Means of Improving Jury Competence in Complex Civil Litigation,
24 Am. L. Rnv. 715 (1982) ("[one] argument against having jury trials is that due process
of law is demed a party if the jury is unable to understand the issues and reach a rational
decision."), citing Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 829 (1980); see Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex
Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 965 (1980);
Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69 CAssu. L. Rnv
1 (1981).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial in Civil
Cases
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides for a jury trial in civil cases involving issues at law as
distinguished from matters in equity.8 But the seventh amendment
right to jury trial has not been made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9
Consequently, the seventh amendment applies only to federal court
proceedings. In product design litigation, this means that the fed-
eral constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases is implicated
only when such actions are brought m federal courts sitting in
diversity cases. 10
To understand the relative merits of any proposal calling for
deviation from the constitutional norm in complex design litiga-
tion, the historical evolution of the right to jury trial in federal
civil cases must be scrutinized. An initial observation leads to the
conclusion that the right to a jury is firmly entrenched in Anglo-
American jurisprudence." For example, the right to a jury trial
enjoyed a fair measure of respect in England before the United
States was colomzed,' 2 and the right to jury trial was highly
regarded by many of the early English settlers who arrived in
Jamestown.' 3 Tus reverence continued during the colomal period,
I U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
9 It is a well-established rule that the Bill of Rights restricts only the federal
government. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833);
see also Minneapolis & St. Lotus R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) ("[T]he first
ten Amendments, including of course the Seventh, are not concerned with state action and
deal only with federal action."); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 235
(1917) ("It is conceded that [the Seventh Amendment] has no reference to proceedings in
the state courts."), aff'g, State v. Mountain Timber Co., 135 P 645 (Wash. 1913). By
the process of incorporation, however, certain fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights are
made applicable to the states via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & N. YouNo, CoNsrrruTnoNAL LAW 412-14 (2d ed. 1983).
"0 Although a greater number of products liability cases are actually filed in state
courts (and generally in the state of the plaintiff's residence), some cases continue to be
brought in federal district courts when there is a complete diversity of citizenship. W
KEETON, supra note 1, at 22.
" See In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, Gant v. Umon Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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and eventually inspired debate at the original constitutional con-
vention about whether the right to jury trial in civil cases should
be protected by the United States Constitution. 14
The constitutional debate ultimately produced the seventh
amendment and its jury trial guarantee "in Suits at common
law." 15 But some dissension existed. A few detractors voiced con-
cern that a jury, when given such a'broad mandate, would inevi-
tably consider questions that exceeded their competence and
understanding 6 and that such matters were more appropriate for
courts of equity, not juries. 17 These dissenting views were not
given much consideration by those who drafted the foundational
charter of the government of the United States.18
Against this historical background, the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the venerable status of the right
to jury trial in civil cases by noting that the "[m]aintenance of
the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies
so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to jury trial should be scrutinized with
the utmost care."' 19 Although the Court's remarks seem well-
founded, circumstances may exist that justify limiting the right to
a jury trial in some manner. Further, the policy reasofis underlying
such curtailment may be so compelling as to withstand the most
exacting judicial scrutiny The common explanation has been that
the due process right to a fair and rational analysis of the facts
and law supports, under limited circumstances, a departure from
seventh amendment precepts. 20
14 Id. at 420.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Lytle v. Household Mfg. Inc., - U.S.
II0 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1990) ("preserves the right to trial by jury in 'Suits at common
law"'). "'Suits at common law' refers to 'suits in which legal rights [are] to be ascertained
and determined. .' Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, - U.S.
, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1344 (1990) (emphasis in the original).
26 In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d at 420 n.30.
I7 d.
Id. at 420.
9 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
10 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (The Court advanced a three-
prong analytic framework to determine whether a right to jury trial exists: I) the pre-
merger custom with respect to such issues (i.e., whether a jury trial would have been
ordered dunng the period before the merger of courts of equity and courts of law); 2) the
remedy sought (i.e., whether legal or equitable); and 3) the "practical abilities and limi-
tations of juries."). The third prong has been commonly referred to as "the complexity
of litigation" exception to the right to a jury trial in civil cases.
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B. The State Right to Jury Trial
Although the seventh amendment is inapplicable in state court
proceedings, the right to jury trial in civil cases is generally pro-
vided in most state constitutions. 21 These state provisions typically
differ in content and in scope from the seventh amendment.2 As
a result, a perusal of some of the representative state constitutional
provisions should shed some light on the nature and extent of the
right to jury trial at the state level.
The genesis of many state constitutional provisions concerning
the right to jury trial in civil cases is undoubtedly the English
common law.2 Many states have explicit statutory provisions that
accept the common law of England, except to the extent that it
has been modified or changed by statute.24 These so-called recep-
tion statutes reflect a deep, abiding connection between the various
states' laws and the common law of England. Thus, any analysis
of the precise contours of any state-based right to jury trial in
civil cases must be conducted against the backdrop of the English
common law This seems consistent with traditional seventh
amendment analysis in which 1791, the year the amendment was
adopted, serves as the English comparative standard to measure
the intent of the framers of the Constitution.25
In connection with the various state constitutional provisions,
some uncertainty exists concermng the appropriate time frame to
determine the intent of the delegates to the various state consti-
tutional conventions. Should one focus upon the English common
law as of the date of ratification of the United States Constitu-
21 See CONSTrrTIoNs OF TnE UNITED STATES (1962 & Spec. Supp. 1972) (published
for the Legislative Research Drafting Fund of Columbia Univ.).
2 See id. (a discussion of the diverse state constitutional provisions).
" United States v. Wonson, 28 F Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750)
("Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the common law of any
individual state (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common law of England, the
grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.").
14 See, e.g., AR. CODE ANN. § 1-2-119 (1987) (formerly ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-101
(1976)).
1 See Colgrove v. Batkin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1978), vacated
631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). Ironically, the right to jury trial in civil cases has been
virtually abrogated in England. Crook, supra note 6, at 1594. A possible explanation for
the civil jury's persistence in the United States is that this country, unlike Great Britain,
has not come to grips with its sovereignty. Thus, the jury serves as a check on permanent
governmental power. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. Cm.
LEGAL F 87, 88. Hence, the primary justification for the civil jury may be more related
to politics than to actual fact-finding. Id.
1990-91]
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tion?26 Or as of the date the particular state was admitted into the
Umon?27 Or as of the date the particular constitutional provision
was ratified?2 Or should one's judgment be informed by existing
interpretations of the seventh amendment to the Umted States
Constitution?29 These determinations are fraught with uncertainty.
Without more illuminating information concermng the intent of
state framers, it may be necessary to use one of the foregoing
points of reference to determine the boundaries of the state con-
stitutional right to jury trial in civil cases.
The deternmnation of the precise scope of the right to jury
trial under state constitutional provisions is not generally a facile
undertaking. A cautious approach to this problem requires a
searching examination of some diverse, but carefully selected, state
jury trial guarantees in civil cases. This analysis should prove
helpful in delineating the boundaries of the right to jury trial in
state civil cases.
1. Representative State Constitutional Provisions: An Analysis
A close examination of the myriad state constitutional provi-
sions reveals that the vast majority of states provide a constitu-
tional right to jury trial in civil cases.30 For example, many state
constitutions simply declare that "the right of. trial by jury shall
remain inviolate," or words to that effect. 31 Implicit in this state-
ment is the notion that the right extends not only to criminal
26 As previously noted, this is the proper measurement of the intent of the framers
of the United States Constitution. In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d at 421;
see also Thatcher, Why Not Use the Special Jury?, 31 Mn4r. L. REv. 232, 248 (1947)
("[I]n the absence of specific constitutional change, the jury trial guaranteed by the
constitutions of all states in which territorial government preceded statehood, is the same
as jury trial at common law, the characteristics thereof having been indirectly controlled
by the United States Constitution.").
7Id. ("[A]s each territory attained statehood and adopted a constitution guarantee-
ing jury trial, the local practice then current must have been continued and preserved as
an unalterable feature of the state judicial system.").
Is Id. ("In the case of states which were formed without passing through territorial
status, it is purely a historical question as to what the practice with respect to special
juries was in those states at the time of the adoption of the local constitutional provisions
guaranteeing jury trial.").
2See In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d at 419-20.
"See CoNsTIrTIoNs OF TIE UNITED STATEs, supra note 21.
3, See, e.g., ARx. CoNsT., art. II, §-7; CONN. CONST., art. I, § 19; FLA. CONST., art.
I, § 22; ILL. CoNsT., art. I, § 13; IND. CoNsT., art. I, § 20; IowA CONST., art. I, § 9;
KAN. CoNsT., Bill of Rights, § 5; MINN. CONST., art. I, § 4.
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cases, but also to civil cases. The authorities addressing this issue
certainly bear flus out.32
Another line of state constitutional provisions, however, qual-
ifies the right to jury trial in civil cases. For instance, a common
limitation restricts the right to jury trial to actions at law 33 This
limitation highlights the importance of making meaningful dis-
tinctions between suits in equity and actions at law because, at
common law, the right to jury trial existed only in actions at law 34
Additionally, some state constitutions modify the common law
right to jury trial by linking it to an amount in controversy 35 For
example, the Alaskan Constitution provides as follows: "In Civil
Cases where the amount in controversy exceeds two hundred fifty
dollars, the right of trial by a jury of twelve is preserved to the
same extent as it existed at common law.''36 Other constitutional
provisions are similar and differ only in the amount necessary to
trigger the jury trial guarantee. 37
Furthermore, some state constitutional provisions recognize the
inviolability of the right to jury trial, but concede that it may be
"subject to such modifications as may be authorized by" other
provisions of the constitution. 3 Although such constitutional pro-
tection may not be absolute, it does provide a formidable barrier
against unwarranted governmental interference.
Finally, some state constitutions do not expressly embrace a
right to jury trial in civil cases. 39 In such states, the state legislature
32 Thatcher, supra note 26, at 232 ("Jiury trial in America is intimately associated
with the actuating causes of the American Revolution, and has a deep emotional appeal
quite aside from its intrinsic merits as a legal institution."); see also Dwyer, Protecting
the Right of Trial by Jury, 25 TRiAL 77, 79 (June 1989) ("Today, we still have trial by
jury in the United States, and it is almost umque in the world. We have it in both civil
and criminal cases."); GA. CONST., art. I, XI (discussing under the rubric of "Right to
trial by jury" both the right to jury trial in criminal and civil cases).
11 See, e.g., ARK. CoNsT., art. II, § 7; MINN. CONST., art. I, § 4.
14 See In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d at 416 (court acknowledges that
the right to jury trial hinges upon the legal-equitable dichotomy).
11 See, e.g., HAW. CONST., art. I, § 13 ("In suits at common law where the value in
controversy shall exceed one thousand dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served.").
SALAsKA. CoNsT., art. I, § 16.
11 See HAw CoNsT., art. I, § 13.
Ky. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 7.
1, The state of Louisiana is a prime example. Perhaps the absence of a civil jury
trial constitutional provision is explicable in terms of Louisiana's French civil code tradi-
tion. But see GA. CoNsT., art. I, § 1, XI (the right to jury trial is subject to several
exceptions, namely, "where no issuable defense is filed and where a jury is not demanded
in writing by either party.").
1990-91]
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probably can make sweeping changes in civil litigation without
necessarily offending any jury trial guarantee. For example, some
states have developed alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
that totally dispense with the jury4° and place complete trust in an
alternative fact-finding process to resolve disputes. Such proce-
dures may be more suspect in the face of some state constitutional
provisions that clearly mandate the right to jury trial in civil
cases .
41
2. Deviations from State Constitutional Norms: Are They
Permissible in Connection with Civil Jury Trials?
Dispensing, with the right to jury trial in complex design liti-
gation in state courts hinges largely upon the language of the
pertinent state constitutional provisions and concomitant judicial
interpretations. 42 Fewer obstacles may exist in those states where
ambiguous civil jury trial guarantees exist. 43 In those states, a
"complexity of litigation" exception to the right to jury trial could
40 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr. Assoc. v. New York, 550 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1990)
("New York Lemon Law, which compels automobile manufacturer's participation in
arbitration of motor vehicle defect claims at consumer's option, does not violate New
York Constitution's guarantee of right to jury trial or unconstitutionally delegate judicial
power to private arbitrators;" such action is equitable in nature and would not have been
triable by jury at common law).
41 See, e.g., FLA. CONST., art. I, § 22 ("The right of trial by jury shall be secure to
all and remain inviolate."); IND. CONST., art. i, § 20 ("In all civil cases, the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate."); ILL. CONST., art. I, § 13 ("The right of trial by jury as
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate"). The Illinois General Assembly has authorized
the Illinois Supreme Court to mandate arbitration of civil cases not exceeding $15,000 in
value. ILL. CODE Crv PROC. ch. 110, §§ 2-IO0IA-2-1006A (West 1986). However, a party
who rejects the arbitral decision may proceed to a trial before a judge or jury, upon
payment of the costs and fees, imposed by the Illinois Supreme Court Rule, arising from
the rejection of the arbitration. Id. See also Ill. Supreme Court Rule 93(a) which fixes
such cost at $200 and Ill. Supreme Court Rule 93(c) which allows a court to waive the
$200 costs in the case of a poor person. Ill. Practice Rules, ch. IlOA. 93 (1987).
42 The large array of state constitutional provisions present difficult interpretative
problems. It is apparent that no ironclad interpretative rule will suffice.
43 See, e.g., MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 5 ("That the Inhabitants of
Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according
to the course of that law."). But the Maryland General Assembly has moved cautiously
in the face of this somewhat vague provision. For example, Maryland uses a court-annexed,
instead of a binding arbitration system in medical malpractice actions. Under this statutory
plan, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the arbitral award, he or she can pursue the claim
in court. But the claimant must prove that the arbitration decision was erroneous. MD.
Crs. & JuD. PRoC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to 3-2A-09 (1989).
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be created by either the courts or the state legislatures. 44 Although
such state constitutional limitations may allow such corrective
action, public policy considerations still may argue in favor of a
trial by jury in civil cases. 41 Such policy restrictions, however, may
be overshadowed by the need for a mechanism to enhance the
likelihood of a fair and rational evaluation of the factual issues
in complex design litigation.
A greater obstacle to change may exist in those jurisdictions
which maintain that, although the right to jury trial in civil cases
exists, it is "subject to such modifications as may be authorized
by this Constitution." This statement reflects the exalted status
of the right to jury trial, which cannot be undermined in the
absence of compelling circumstances. However, this declaration
does not mean that the right to jury trial is impregnable. The
statement indicates only that modifications should be reserved for
exceptional reasons, and thus may be correspondingly more dif-
ficult to justify Some flexibility exists that may allow an exception
for complex design cases that exceed the practical abilities of a
jury
Those state constitutions basically providing that the right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate present the greatest obstacle to
modification. 47 How can one interpret such straightforward lan-
guage to allow for any deviation from the norm? 48 The most direct,
and perhaps more precarious, route to pursue in such states is a
constitutional amendment. Although it is not uncommon for state
- The practical difficulties associated with the "complexity of litigation" exception
to the nght to jury trial are (1) providing operational guidelines or standards for trial
courts to determine what cases are too complex for a jury and (2) avoiding the situation
where recognition of the "complexity" exception for one type of case opens the door for
other types of cases. See In re Fin. Secs. Litigation, 609 F.2d at 431-432.
11 An important public policy consideration is that a jury represents the vanguard of
"justice for all." See G. SPENCE, WITH JUSTCE FoR NoNE: DESTOYno AN AmEicAN
MYra 3-4 (1989) (commentator argues essentially that juries, and not judges, provide the
frontline defense against the powerful corporate and insurance oligarchies that purportedly
threaten individual justice in the United States).
- Ky. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 7.
4 See, e.g., Miss. CoNsT., art. III, § 31.
41 It has been suggested that this phrasing refers to the "historical" test for Seventh
Amendment analysis and would allow a modification of the right to a jury trial in civil
cases to the extent of special juries, which existed in England in 1791, and should therefore
be permissible under such state constitutions. Thatcher, supra note 26, at 243-49. Moreover,
such modification may be authorized by state statute. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
296 (1947) (a state's use of special juries is constitutionally permissible) and In re Asbestos
Litigation, 551 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Del. Super. 1988) ("juror qualifications have long been
treated as matters within legislative control and not being constitutionally fixed").
1990-91]
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constitutions to be amended, the amendment process remains laden
with difficulties. 49 The requirements vary, but political hurdles
make this a daunting endeavor.50
Offering a limited constitutional exception- for complex prod-
uct design litigation at the expense of other compelling concerns
is potentially problematical. For any political coalition to be vic-
torious in obtaining a constitutional amendment of this nature, a
number of diverse, and perhaps competing, interests must be
placated. In political terms, this means that divergent interests
must perceive that their constituent concerns will benefit from
such an effort.51 The real danger is that either very little will be
done or, alternatively, that any amendment will be so diluted that
it will actually be devoid of any significant meaning and effect.5 2
The reform of complex product design jurisprudence will most
likely suffer in the process. Thus, as either a practical or political
matter, relief from such constitutional provisions may rest with
state courts.
In fact, state courts may represent the only hope for meaning-
ful fact-finding reform in complex product design litigation, as it
4 See W DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITIONS 132-33
(1910) (Difficulty in the amendment process results from "(1) the actual limitations in the
constitutions as to the number, frequency, and character of proposals, and (2) the popular
vote required for the adoption of amendments."); A. STuim, TaITY YEARs oF STATE
CONSTITUTIoN-MAINO: 1938-1968 1 (1970) ("Although all state constitutions contain pro-
visions for their alteration, the amending process has failed to keep them up to date. ").
" E..CoRNwEIL, JR., J. GOODMAN, & W SWANSON, STATE CONsTrTUTONAL CON-
VENTIONS: THE POLITIC9 OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES 192 (1975)
("[Clonstitutional revision is a political process. As such it does tap the full range of
motives and interests called into play by the other political subprocesses at the state
level."). Political gndlock is then a distinct threat to the state constitutional amendment
and revision processes. See RECENT CONSTrrUTIONAL REVISION AcTIVITms: 1967-1968 (The
Council of St. Govts., 1969) (noting that political haggling caused some discord during a
past New York constitutional convention). To understand the technical distinction between
"amendment" and "revision," see J. WHEELER, JR., SALIENT ISSUES OF CONsTrTiONAL
REVISION 50 (1961). Amendment usually refers to a change of limited scope involving one
or a limited number of provisions of a constitution. More .often than not this is initiated
by legislative or initiative proposals. Revision, on the other hand, means reconsideration
of the whole or a major portion of the constitution and has usually been undertaken
through a convention. Id.
1, Political inertia generally will be overcome when the benefits of an activity exceed
the political costs. Harris, Communicating the Hazards of Toxic Substance Exposure, 39
J. LEOAL EDuc. 97, 107 (1989).
12 Because of political compromising with and influence peddling by special interest
groups, the state constitutional amendment process is particularly vulnerable to dilution.
See TORTS AND RETORTS 1 (AALS Newsletter, Fall 1989) ("[P]olitics is what lobbyists and
legislators engage in.").
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is inconceivable that such radical modifications will be imple-
mented without some significant judicial activism.53 But what
amendatory actions are available to the courts in such circum-
stances? Perhaps the "complexity of litigation" exception will
justify some deviation from the norm to promote the due process
demands for fair and rational adjudication in complex civil liti-
gation.5 4 This may provide a justification for abandomng the right
to a jury trial in complex product design cases.
II. Tmi COMPETING ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE DENIAL OF THE
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEx CIviL LITIGATION
A. The Argument in Favor of the Status Quo
Whenever an argument is advanced to abandon the right to
jury trial because of the purported complexity of the factual issues
involved in the case, strong counterarguments are invariably of-
fered. The counterarguments are generally made on two levels.
First, it is argued that junes have time-tested ability to resolve
issues inherent in highly complex litigation.55 Second, assuming
that complexity of litigation is the litmus test for denying the right
to jury trial in civil cases, "[w]here would the courts draw the
line between those cases which are, and those which are not, too
complex for a jury9", 56 These arguments reflect an uneasiness with
any perceived attempt to erode the right to jury trial in civil cases.
Have juries actually demonstrated their practical ability to
decide rationally complex civil litigation issues? This question has
arisen principally in consolidated antitrust litigation and securities
regulations litigation. The complexity of these cases has prompted
motions to strike demands for jury trials.5 7 Complex design cases
" Courts have been frequently called upon to fill the gaps resulting from legislative
inaction. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (Supreme Court approved the use of the "bubble concept" by the states in
regulating nonattamment ["dirty" air] areas in the face of Clean Air Act's unhelpful
language and ambiguous legislative history).
4Spiegel, The Jury and Complex Cases, CAsE & CoM., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 13, 15
(The "most recent assault on the Seventh Amendment" is the assertion that "juries are
incompetent to sit in judgment on 'complex' cases.").
1S In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 929 (1980) ("experience demonstrates that juries are capable of sorting out
complex factual issues and applying law to them").
5' Id.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa.
1979), vacated 631 F.2d 1069 (3rd Cir. 1980).
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may likewise come within the ambit of the "complexity of litiga-
tion" exception, assuming such special treatment is warranted.5 8
Some staunch supporters of the right to jury trial do not
believe that "any case is so overwhelmingly complex that it is
beyond the abilities of a jury -59 Instead, supporters argue "time
nught be better spent in searching for ways to improve rather than
erode the jury system." 6 Although this argument may be com-
pelling in view of the history of the seventh amendment and its
state counterparts, it tends to lose much of its appeal in complex
product design cases. 61 In such suits serious questions arise about
the practical abilities of lay jurors to handle such awesome re-
sponsibilities.
Two federal court decisions provide the most forceful argu-
ments in favor of the jury trial system. In Zenith Radio Corp. v
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,62 a Pennsylvania federal district court,
in a consolidated antitrust case, framed the issue in terms of
"whether trial by jury, usually available as of right in private,
11 Complex product litigation resembles both consolidated antitrust and securities
regulations litigation in the difficulty of managing such cases. See, e.g., In re Richardson-
Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd
in part, and vacated and remanded in part, In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989), where a federal jury deduced that Bendectin
does not cause birth defects notwithstanding conflicting expert medical testimony. The
federal district judge trifurcated "the trial into hearings on causation, liability and dam-
ages" to facilitate case management. Moss, Bendectin - Round 2, 74 A.B.A. J. 23 (Nov.
1988).
5, In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d at 432.
60 Id.
1, In view of the scientific and techmcal complexity of most product design litigation,
it is difficult to imagine that the existing jury system could properly function without some
modification. See, e.g., Drazan, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72
JuDicATmE 292, 294 (1989) (ughlighting the complexity associated with toxic tort litigation
and concluding "that complex scientific and medical evidence, coupled with voluminous
discovery necessary to account for the latency period, are beyond the jury's reach"). Such
arguments seem readily transferable to the complex product design litigation context.
62 478 F Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (Third
Circuit held that "complexity of litigation" can provide the basis for denying a jury trial
in a civil case; Third Circuit's decision was based on due process considerations mandating
rational decision making by the jury). In addressing the issue of operational standards to
determine whether a particular case is too complex for a jury, the Third Circuit provided
three vague guidelines: (1) the overall size of the suit-taking into consideration the
estimated length of the trial, the volume of evidence to be presented, and the number of
issues requiring consideration; (2) the conceptual difficulties of the legal issues and the
facts supporting them-likely to be determined by the amount of expert testimony to be
offered and the length and detail of the jury instructions; and (3) the "difficulty of
separating distinct aspects of the case." In re Japanese Electromc Products Antitrust
Litig., 631 F.2d at 1088-89.
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treble-damage antitrust cases, is guaranteed even in a case so
massive and complex as to be beyond 'the practical abilities and
limitations of juries." '63 The court emphatically rejected the sug-
gestion that the complexity of the subject matter of the trial
precluded a jury from making a fair and rational determination
consistent with the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 64
The court noted that checks existed against a jury's capriciousness,
namely, the trial court's power to direct verdicts or grant motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 6- These powers allow
the courts to remove the case from the jury to avoid an irrational
verdict.
Furthermore, important societal values may be fostered by the
jury function. Many individuals believe that the right to trial by
a jury representing a cross section of the community has significant
social utility." Additionally, jury verdicts that may be "irrational"
do not provide an adequate basis for radical departure from the
jury process, as such verdicts generally lack precedential value and
have correspondingly little systemic effect. 67 Further, supporters
argue that a jury has the "right" to deviate from the law in order
to promote "justice" in a particular case. 68 The systemic risk from
an aberrational decision by a jury in a highly complex case may
not be so ominous as to warrant a radical adjustment of the right
to jury trial in civil cases.
In view of the foregoing perspectives, juries, even in complex
cases, provide a peculiar brand of justice that has sustained our
civil justice system for years. According to the court in Zenith
Radio, "the jury also provides a needed check on judicial power." 69
63 Id. at 899.
" Id. at 936.
61 Id. at 937, 938 ("proper and frequent judicial guidance" should assuage the
problem).
" Spiegel, supra note 54, at 13 (extolling the virtue of "citizen participation in the
admmstration of justice").
61 Jury verdicts are invariably ad hoc determinations grounded generally on notions
of fairness and justice. Such determinations are narrowly focused and are usually limited
to the peculiar facts of a case. 1 0. HARnxs & A. SQUILANTE, WARRANTY LAW IN TORT
AND CONorC ActioNs § 3.8 (1989) (commenting on the private tort system in connection
with proximate cause determinations).
" A jury's prerogative to deviate from the "law" to effectuate justice arises from
the notion that "a jury is umquely qualified to interpret the law in accordance with public
values and mores." Crook, supra note 6, at 1599. But see Dwyer, supra note 32, at 79
(as a formal matter, jury nullification "lives on today, in one respect, and that is the right
of the jury to acquit in a crimnal case, no matter what").
6 Zenith Radio Corp., 478 F Supp. at 942.
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Thus, the court held that complexity of the litigation was "not a
constitutionally permissible reason for striking the plaintiffs' jury
demands.' '70
In another decision, 'In re United States Financial Securities
Litigation,71 the Ninth Circuit, in a consolidated securities case,
considered the possible existence of a "complexity" exception to
the right to jury trial under the seventh amendment. In a thought-
ful decision, the court strongly endorsed the jury system in civil
cases. The court rejected "complexity" as a standard for deter-
imnng entitlement to a jury trial. Instead, the court acknowledged
that the seventh amendment guarantee is actually a function of
whether the action is characterized as either legal or equitable. 72
Thus, if the case is one in law and not in equity, a right to jury
trial exists irrespective of the question of complexity and the jury's
ability to deal with complex issues adequately.73
In addressing the issue of case complexity, the court down-
played the complexity of the case and emphasized the respective
roles of attorneys and trial judges in complex civil litigation. The
court noted that attorneys can serve a palliative role by simplifying
a complex case. Moreover, trial judges can reduce complexity by
attempting "to control, manage and direct the course of complex
cases." 74
In connection with the practical abilities of jurors, the court
unabashedly noted that "experience demonstrates that juries are
capable of sorting out complex factual issues and applying law to
them. ' 75 Regardless of one's feelings about such unwavering de-
votion to the jury system, the indisputable fact is that juries
actually do decide such matters. How juries accomplish this task,
however, is an altogether different issue.
As a practical matter, the court in In re United States Financial
Securities Litigation makes a valid point. Here again, "[w]here
would the courts draw the line between those cases which are, and
those which are not, too complex for a jury" ' 76 This is a legitimate
matter of concern for those who champion the "complexity of
70 Id.
71 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929.
7 Id. at 416.
71 Id. at 416-17.
7 Id. at 427.
7' Id. at 431.
76 Id.
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litigation" exception. 7 The primary concern of this Article is
whether complex product design cases fall within the boundaries
of this exception. Moreover, should the "complexity" exception
be restricted to antitrust and securities cases, which previously
have been the primary areas of judicial involvement?7
Although the foregoing questions about the "complexity" ex-
ception may test the most intrepid soul, they do not present an
inscrutable problem. Instead, serious reflection may indicate
whether more drastic measures are needed to insure that due
process exists in complex design cases. Perhaps some design cases
are so complex as to go beyond the capabilities of a jury 79 In
such a case, does the seventh amendment or its state constitutional
counterparts allow a departure from the right to jury trial in civil
cases?
B. The Argument for Change
It seems illogical to contend that juries have the capacity to
decide all issues, regardless of the difficulty or complexity in-
volved. Complex product design cases frequently test the outer
limits of understanding of a lay person.80 Moreover, such cases
generally invoke a battle of the experts on highly techmcal mat-
ters.81 To contend unequivocally that a lay jury can routinely sort
out these complex facts seems to ignore reality
The inherent complexity in complex product design cases raises
several plausible justifications for sanctiomng a departure from
the conventional right to trial by jury First, the historical dichot-
17 Spiegel, supra note 54, at 15-16 ("no one has or can define what is a complex
case"). In view of the apparent difficulty in delineating what is complex, can a court, as
a practical matter, properly create a "complexity of litigation" exception to the seventh
amendment? But see In re Japanese Electromc Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d
1069, 1088 (3d Cir. 1980) (leaving the deternunation of "complexity" for district court's
consideration on remand).
71 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
7 See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d at 431-32. In this case, the Ninth
Circuit hypothesized whether an airplane design case came within the pale of the "com-
plexity" exception. Such design cases may contain myriad complex issues that defy reasoned
analysis by a lay juror.
10 See City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 919 (2d Cir. 1981). Although
the court concluded that the retrofit issue was not too complex for a jury to decide, it did
not absolutely reject the "complexity exception." Id. at 920.
1, In a design case, an expert witness is generally required to deal with the issue of
the feasibility of a safer, alternative design. This frequently produces a battle of the
experts. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1987)
(Westlaw, State directory, OH file).
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omy between actions at law and actions in equity allows some
deviation from the right to jury trial. Complex design cases ar-
guably can be analogized to an equitable accounting at common
law, which was deemed to be so complex as to be triable only by
the court.82 If the English common law of 1791 is the touchstone
for determining the right to jury trial under the seventh amend-
ment, complex design cases can be tried, with some historical
justification, by means other than a conventional jury
Second, a footnote appearing in the United States Supreme
Court decision of Ross v Bernhard83 seems to lend some credence
to the "complexity of litigation" exception. In Ross, the Court
suggested that the seventh amendment jury trial guarantee may be
subject to a "complexity" qualification . 4 If accepted literally, this
comment arguably would allow a court to adopt a new interpre-
tation of the seventh amendment in light of the practical abilities
and limitations of juries. A principal issue is whether the Ross
footnote deserves such an expansive reading.85
Finally, a plausible argument may be advanced that due proc-
ess concerns militate against allowing a jury to decide claims
beyond their comprehension. 6 Although the jury system is easy
to attack in this regard, presenting an alternative solution to the
problem of adjudicating complex design cases in a fair and rational
manner is extremely difficult. 7 Nevertheless, this should not ob-
scure the issue of the jury's possible incapacity in such litigation. 8
,2 Spiegel, supra note 54, at 16 ("complexity renders a suit equitable in nature").
,3 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
Id. at 538 n.10.
" Certainly, a plausible argumeht can be made that the pertinent Ross footnote is
merely dictum and should not have any precedential value. See In re United States Fin.
Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d at 425 n.43. On the other hand, the issue raised "by the Ross
footnote was whether in 1791 an English Chancellor would have considered the 'practical
abilities and limitations of juries' and taken into equity a case that he regarded as too
complex for jury resolution." Campbell, The Current Understanding of the Seventh
Amendment: Jury Trials in Modern Complex Litigation, 66 WAsH. U.L.Q. 63, 65 (1988).
" The due process argument is grounded upon the notion that an uninformed jury
verdict is neither impartial nor rational and is bereft of fundamental fairness. Demetrio,
Should Juries Decide Complex Cases?, 21 TRA. 44, 47 (1985) (presenting arguments in
favor of the "complexity of litigation" exception, though ultimately rejecting them).
" The crucial question is whether a satisfactory alternative to jury trial in civil cases
is reasonably available. See Spiegel, supra note 54, at 20.
" In the event the present jury system should become overwhelmed by burgeomng
complex civil litigation, some competent fact-finder must come forward and fill the void.
Such informed decision making is an indispensable element of our civil justice system.
Campbell, supra note 85, at 66 ("the primary value promoted by due process in fact-
finding procedures is 'to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions').
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Although precise evaluation of the relative merits of the com-
peting arguments regarding the "complexity of litigation" excep-
tion is probably impossible, the myriad uncertainties attending the
evaluation of complex design cases by juries should engender some
thoughts, consistent with constitutional doctnnes, about less intru-
sive alternative methods for adjudicating such claims.
III. THm ALTERNATIVES
A. A Jury of Experts
Whenever complex, esoteric issues confront our legal system,
it is frequently asked whether conventional fact-finders have the
requisite ability to decide such matters. Suggestions ranging from
a "Science Court" to a "blue ribbon" jury have been offered as
reasonable alternatives.8 9
Although the foregoing alternatives may provide some bene-
fits, possible drawbacks also exist. For instance, some contend
that such a system would be too time-consuning. 9° Time costs do
present a potential problem, particularly in connection with the
selection process. Who will select the "experts" for a special panel
of fact-finders? How do you reach a consensus between the parties
concerning the qualifications of the "expert" jurors? Certainly, a
significant amount of disagreement could surround such issues.
Furthermore, along with the problem of delay, significant trans-
action costs which normally accompany any hotly contested issue
could arise.91 Thus, economic inefficiency is a distinct risk of
89 See Note, Court-Sanctioned Means of Improving Jury Competence in Complex
Civil Litigation, 24 Aiz. L. REv. 715, 728 (1982) (defines a "blue ribbon" jury as
"created from a special pool of potential jurors who have specific qualifications well-
suited to trying a particular case"); Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal
Process, 62 CoRNELL L. Rav. 817, 826 (1976-77) ("the most widely publicized suggestion
has been that we create a 'Science Court.' to resolve technical, factual disputes").
90 In addition to time costs, other problems may beset the "blue ribbon" jury
concept. See Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., No. 70834, slip op. at 7 (Del. May 23, 1989)
(Westlaw, state directory, Del. file) (may inject more of a predetermined philosophy; may
actually be more of a prejudicial system; many cases involve more than one area of
expertise, etc.).
11 The specter of huge transaction costs accompanying the "expert jury" process is
a source of consternation because it may undermine the efficiency of the fact-finding
process. It seems unwise to pursue an alternative fact-finding mechamsm that may be as
costly, cumbersome, or inefficient as the existing one. However, if uncertainty is exacer-
bated by the existing civil jury system, along with its concomitant delay, perhaps an expert
jury could reduce this uncertainty and promote a more efficient form of civil dispute
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empaneling an expert jury But is the advantage of increased
fairness worth these unavoidable costs?
Expert juries also present problems of divorcing fact from
policy in -legal decision making. The concern is that a jury of
"technocrats" may be ambivalent about the social policy ramifi-
cations of their decisions. 92 In integrating law and science gener-
ally, it is feared that scientists do not sufficiently appreciate social
policy impulses. 93 Here again, the chief issue is "fact versus social
policy "
Additionally, an expert jury may jeopardize the core value of
impartiality, which goes to the heart of the civil justice system in
the United States. 94
The existing lay jury system may be at some risk with this
innovation. But is this undesirable in a complex design case? A
jury of experts could conceivably harbor some bias-either toward
industry or the injured plaintiff-that could have a deleterious
effect upon the fair and impartial resolution of the case. 95 But,
does this risk differ markedly from the arbitrariness that probably
currently exists in the deliberative process of lay jurors in such
complex litigation?96 Further, this concern ignores the existence of
vor dire to weed out any bias that may undermine the integrity
of the verdict.97 An effective votr dire should miimize the likeli-
hood of such prejudice. 9 When the reduced risk of bias is weighed
resolution. See Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990
U. Cm. LEAL F 161, 197 (jury system introduces an element of uncertainty that inhibits
settlement).
92 See Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEo. L.J.
1341, 1379 (1987).
" Id. at 1379-81 (scientists conduct research without considering societal or legal
consequences).
1'4 Bradley, No. 70834, slip op. at 7.
91 But the bias inherent in an "expert" jury panel may be an inevitable consequence
of any fact-finding process subject to human error.
16 Given the complexity inherent in sophisticated civil litigation, an umnformed lay
juror's decision about an arcane issue may be fraught with arbitrariness. Costantino &
Master, Jr., The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation:
Historical Perspectives and a View from the Bench, 12 AIPLA Q.J. 279 (1984).
17 Voir dire is primarily designed to elicit information from potential jurors to form
the basis for either a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge. When conducted
properly, the problems of juror bias may be ameliorated, if not obviated. See Marshall,
A View From the Bench: Practical Perspectives on Juries, 1990 U. Cm. LEoA F 147,
148 (a key to the proper utilization of the jury is the method of selection).
9s Although there may be some truth to the notion that even the best efforts of
lawyers (or, for that matter, judges) will not assure complete control of the jury, ap-
proaching voir dire assiduously should detect the lion's share of discoverable biases among
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against the benefits of more enlightened decision making by an
expert jury, perhaps an expert jury may be a cost-effective alter-
native.
It may be imprudent, however, to envision, expert juries as a
panacea. Some real risks associated with expert juries exist. But
the pertinent inquiry is whether the net benefits of expert juries
outweigh the net risks or costs. The answer is certainly a matter
of judgment." But, in light of the peculiar problems presented in
complex product design cases, perhaps serious consideration should
be given to having juries composed of individuals with special
expertise as the sole arbiters of such cases.
B. Expert Judges
To those who consider the risks associated with expert juries
to be unacceptably high, an expert judge may be more palatable.
The underlying justification for this alternative is essentially the
same as for the jury of experts; an expert judge will have greater
ability to fairly and rationally decide complex cases.10°
However, a system that relies on expert judges has at least one
drawback. The cost and time associated with traimng a body of
jurists could be staggering.10' And even the commitment of vast
resources will not assure the creation of a cadre of judges with
the requisite knowledge to decide complex design cases. 1° Thus,
the likelihood of generating a cost-effective solution from this
alternative is questionable.
Although the "expert judge" alternative may be impractical,
adjustments could enhance its utility. For example, appointing
special masters to assist judges in complex design cases may have
a desirable effect. This practice is currently sanctioned by the
prospective jurors. See Frank, Judging Junes: Some Cases Too Complex?, 71 A.B.A. J.
26, 27 (Dec. 1985) ("[t]he best lawyer in the world, helped by all the best experts, can't
be sure the light bulb is going on in the jury panel").
9 Cost (or nsk)/benefit analysis is used to determine the cost-effectiveness of a
particular course of action. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEoA STUD. 29,
32-34 (1972).
100 See Spiegel, supra note 54, at 16 ("the critics of the jury system say we should
leave it to a one man educated judicial dispenser to determine what is too difficult for a
jury to understand").
t*1 Traimng is essential if judges are to become "experts." Note, Preserving the Right
to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 99, 115 n.80 (1979) ("judge will
probably be as unfamiliar with complex techmcal matters as the jury").
102 See Bazelon, supra note 89, at 828 ("we can hardly hope to succeed in raising the
judiciary's scientific consciousness").
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'03 and is frequently used to
handle complex civil litigation. Rules 16(c)(6) and 53 permit a
judge to appoint a special master, and this technique has been
frequently used in complex civil litigation.' °' The appointment of
the special master is often made during the pretrial conference.105
In addition to special masters, some situations lend themselves
to the appointment of expert arbitrators. 1 6 From an economic
perspective, expert arbitration may have distinct advantages. Com-
plex product design suits entail massive costs, particularly in dis-
covery and expert witness fees. Arbitration could have a palliative
effect in this regard.10 7 Moreover, protracted litigation consumes
an attorney's valuable time. 08 Expert arbitration may make it
easier for attorneys to pursue complex litigation. In addition, an
expert arbitrator is more likely to fully comprehend the costs and
benefits inherent in complex design cases.'0 9
C. Expert Advisors
Some maintain that in complex litigation, including product
design cases, judges should simply select an expert advisor to assist
them in resolving scientific and techmcal issues." 0 A division of
"03 See FED. R. Civ P 16(c)(6), 53.
104 Id.
oI Although special masters may be appointed during the pre-trial conference phase
of the litigation, they actually serve ai ameliorative function during the trial itself by
making "findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence presented "
or, by providing clarification "when the legal issues appear too complicated for the jury
to handle adequately alone." Note, supra note 89, at 722; see also Wilkinson, Zielinski,
& Curtis, A Bicentennial Transition: Modem Alternatives to Seventh Amendment Jury
Trial in Complex Cases, 37 KAN. L. REv 61, 95 (1988) (perhaps it is "easier and more
meaningful for the court to use special masters or court-appointed experts to sort out and
determine complex facts in a reasoned and rational manner").
206 See Hensler, Court-Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View, 1990 U. Cm. LEGAL
F 399, 402-404 (a discussion of courts availing themselves of the arbitration method of
alternative dispute resolution).
101 Id. at 406-07 ("on average, shorter than trials, involved less attorney preparation
time than trials, costs both courts and private litigants less than trials, and generally
required less time on the schedule queue than trials").
200 Lawyers who work on a contingency fee basis purportedly operate .9n the margin
regarding cash flow. Thus, it is vital that professional time-an irrecoverable asset-not
be squandered. Blum, Big Bucks, But Cash Flow Worries Plague P1 Lawyers, Nat'l
L.J., Apr. 3, 1989, 1, 46 ("case selection is the most critical decision in contingency
work").
209 Hensler, supra note 106, at 399 ("strengthening arbitrator selection procedures
can further increase arbitration's contributions to due process").
110 In support of the use of an expert advisor to assist the judge, see Frank, supra
note 98, at 26.
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opinion exists regarding the appropriateness of such an ap-
proach.' Some have expressed the somewhat cynical view that
these experts will essentially become surrogate judges,"12 because
judges will abdicate their responsibilities and leave vital decisions
to expert advisors. 13 But how does this process differ significantly
from the use of special masters? If the difference is simply one of
degree, then perhaps the expert advisor is a viable alternative.
Some commentators support the use of expert science advi-
sors.1' 4 One commentator suggests that fears concermng excessive
influence can be minimized by properly defining and limiting the
advisor's role." 5 The benefit derived from an expert advisor may
overshadow the concomitant risks. Because a particular risk/ben-
efit analysis will invariably reflect an individual's judgment as to
the propriety of this alternative to the traditional jury system," 6 a
cost/benefit analysis will not always yield hard and fast answers." 7
An interesting question surrounding the expert advisor alter-
native is to what extent it would sup'plant the jury system. In
theory, the advisor would simply counsel the judge. Hence, con-
troversial factual questions such as defectiveness in design and
causation would remain within the province of the jury "18 It would
be incumbent upon the attorneys to utilize adeptly their expert
witnesses or be bound by the potentially unaided, uninformed
judgment of the jury Furthermore, whenever such expert witnesses
disagree on the interpretation of any factual issue, their expert
M See Bazelon, supra note 89, at 828 ("we could appoint expert science advisors, to
sit at the right hand of a judge when he is considering a case with scientific overtones").
Judge Baselon ultimately rejects the expert advisor alternative. Id.
,2 Id. (commentator concludes that the attendant risk is not worth any corresponding
benefit that might be derived from a scientific advisor).
"1 Id.
"4 See, e.g., Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv 509, 546-54 (1974).
"' Leventhal describes the appropriate role as a "hybrid between a master and a
scientific law clerk. " Id.
116 One commentator has observed that rarely has a preordained mathematical formula
been the sole basis for decision making. See, e.g., Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and Risks:
Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARv ENVTL. L. REv. 191,
210 (1980) ("It is impossible to discover a single example of decisionmaking being reduced
to simple computation. ").
"1 Despite its drawbacks, risk-benefit analysis is a "helpful analytical tool." W
KxEnoN, supra note 1, at 59. Obviously, it is not the only approach to resolving multifac-
eted problems.
- The issue of causal defectiveness is a factual question normally for jury determi-
nation. M. SHAPo, TEm LAW OF PRODUCTs LiAairry 9.14 (1987).
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opinion will not be binding on the jury ,19 The jury, then, could
rely upon their own judgment concerning the facts. 120
Under the expert advisor alternative, therefore, a lay jury
would not be completely removed from the deliberative process.
In fact, the ultimate fact-finding function would fall squarely upon
the jury This, of course, heightens the likelihood that different
juries will reach divergent results .'2  But if a jury's judgment is
reasonably informed, this may actually be irrelevant. 12 Unfortu-
nately, this is most likely only when the expert witnesses are in
complete agreement about the matter at issue. How frequently will
this occur in a complex design case replete with scientific and
technological uncertainty9 Infrequently at best. Consequently, the
expert advisor proposal probably will not provide absolute protec-
tion against arbitrary and capricious decision making by a lay
jury But this minor flaw does not undermine the utility of this
approach as one tool in an overall package of meaningful reform.
D. Leave "AS IS" with No Radical Changes
Is there any reason to recommend the preservation of the status
quo9 To be sure, the existing right to jury trial is designed to
insure an impartial and rational determination of the issues raised
during civil litigation. 123 Are these objectives achievable in complex
product design cases? Perhaps not in a purely theoretical sense.
But perhaps from a practical perspective.
Historically, juries have been viewed as representing a cross
section of the community 124 Because of this unique status, a jury's
11 Id. at 23.0612[a] ("conflicting testimony of experts raises an issue for the trier
of fact").
121 This, again, is consistent with the fundamental notion that juries must weigh the
credibility of expert witnesses regarding factual issues in dispute. See, e.g., Bruemg v.
American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Wisc. 1970) (jury rejected an expert
witness' testimony concerning the foreseeability of plaintiff's conduct).
222 But ad hoc decision making has long been a distinct element of the American civil
justice system. For example, individual justice is purportedly the essence of the law of
torts. Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individualized Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 561 (1987) ("the common law tradition of individual justice").
"I A well-informed decision is the stuff of which due process is made. Drazan, supra
note 61, at 292, 297 ("procedural due process issue raised by special juries centers around
the litigants' right to an impartial and capable jury").
'1' See G. SPENCE, supra note 45, at 91, intimating that, when the jury controlled the
fact-finding process, there was justice for all.
124 In re Asbestos Litig., 551 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Del. 1988) (selection "criteria must
insure 'a cross section of the population suitable in character and intelligence for that civil
duty') (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953)).
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verdict has been frequently characterized as reflecting the com-
munity's sense of justice and fairness. 12 Thus, the jury's common
sense notions of how the matter should be resolved frequently
coincide with what the commumty views as correct and proper.
126
This confluence of philosophical impulses may not exist, however,
in an intricate product design case. 127 In such instances, is a
deviation from the existing right to jury trial justified? Some
cogent arguments support the maintenance of the status quo.
A primary justification for the existing right to jury trial in
complex product design cases is that the system has the "blessing
of age."'12 Given this, some resistance to modification is under-
standable. 2 9 Some advantage in clinging to such a venerable insti-
tution exists. 30
Although some maintain that the jury is techmcally illiterate
in complex civil cases,' this bare assertion should not be allowed
to negate the countless years of undemable success. 32 No alter-
native has such a proven track record. To dispense with the trial
by jury guarantee, and to replace it with an alternative method of
adjudication shrouded in uncertainty, may be ill-advised.
I" Crook, supra note 6, at 1599 ("a contemporaneous expression of community
values").
16 Higginbotham, Continuing Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial
Power, 56 TEx. L. Ra,. 47, 58 (1977) ("[T]he jury's verdict provides the judicial process
with a contemporaneous expression of the community values that bear on the issues of
each case.").
227 To be sure, the typical lay juror's expectations as to complex design features may
markedly differ from those within the general community who are not enlightened by the
testimony of expert witnesses. Thus, a jury decision may occasionally deviate from com-
munity norms.
122 Uncritical acceptance of long-standing practices is not umque to product design
cases. For example, rather than receiving the disdain it deserved, the venerable English
common law rule denying a cause of action for wrongful death was accepted by American
courts without question. 0. HARi, ARKANsAS WRONGFUL DEATH AcTIONS § 1-1 (1984)
(citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 386 (1970)).
I" Spiegel, supra note 54, at 13 (champiomng the value of the right to jury trial in
civil cases).
230 One of the many benefits of the current jury system is the "element of safety in
numbers when one desires to have a factual dispute resolved under the law." Spiegel,
supra note 54, at 13.
232 See, e.g., Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69
CAIn. L. Ra,. 731 (1981) ("The jury's capacity to serve as the repository of the people's
justice, reason, and fair play is being questioned" in complex, lengthy trials.).
232 Though a jury may be technically illiterate, a good track record, coupled with a
feasible means to eliminate this deficiency, may still warrant the retention of the existing
regime.
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The answer may instead lie in fine-tumng the existing jury trial
system, not radically altering it.' This would probably do less
violence to the notion of a trial by jury reflecting a cross section
of the community, which has a sense of the community's ideal of
acceptable behavior regarding product design. In this connection,
a number of ideas ment consideration.
1. Possible Modifications to the Existing System
a. The Simplification of the Data
A modest, but feasible, modification of the existing jury sys-
tem is to simplify the management of the techmcal data inherent
in design cases.134 This may facilitate the jury's assimilation and
understanding of the intricate issues involved-in a complex design
case. 135 But how would this simplification process work in a "real
world" setting? Unfortunately, when one contemplates such a
process, the "Plain English" simplification movement established
for Insurance Law quickly comes to nund.1 16 In that context,
simplification in insurance policy language has perhaps heightened
the. confusion.137 This also may happen under the foregoing sim-
plification proposal.
Assuming that simplification of the lechmcal data warrants
some consideration, several possible methods exist. First, the in-
creased use of special masters (or court-appointed experts) has
been occasionally mentioned. 3 On its face, this may serve to
"1 As occasionally noted, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it!" Perhaps this personifies
the punctilious attitude that should dominate the debate about modifying the right to trial
by jury in complex civil cases.
1" See McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation,
53 U. Cm. L. REv. 440, 491 (1986) (suggesting a number of innovative management
techniques for handling complex civil litigation generally, such as, "computer-assisted
negotiation, scorable game, appellate expert, and case evaluation decision support sys-
tem").
13S In many cases, attorneys and judges can simplify the complexity and promote the
jury's understanding. See Spiegel, supra note 54, at 22; see also G. SPENCE, supra note
45, at 250 ("Plain talk! That is the secret to the art of advocacy.").
3I See, e.g., W YOUNo & E. HoLs s, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TH LAW OF
INsURANCE 239 (2d ed. 1985).
131 Id. ("an attempt to simplify may in fact obscure"). But see Costantino & Master,
supra note 96, at 286 (extolling the value of jury instructions in "Plain English").
,"I See Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshap-
ing Adjudication?, 53 U. Cm. L. R-v 394 (1986), highlighting the increased uses of special
masters "to help manage complex civil cases." In this vein, the commentator notes a
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simplify the complex issues involved. In the past, special masters
have fulfilled this role under a more comprehensive mandate. 1 9 It
seems that a narrower role would be within the special master's
competence. Such individuals could converse with the judge who,
in turn, could provide simplified instructions to the jury 140
Second, skillful and exhaustive use of the pretrial conference
may constitute another simplification device. During the pretrial
conference, the judge, the attorneys, and the court-appointed ex-
pert could sort out the intricate technical questions and reach a
consensus about their presentation to the jury in a comprehensible
fashion. 14' The advantage of this alternative is that it utilizes a
time-tested procedure to simplify trial issues .142 Certainly, this
method is not a striking departure from existing legal processes
and should face less opposition to its implementation.
Third, the reasonable use of a "panel of experts" may enhance
the simplification process.1 43 Caution is advised here, however,
because of the risks inherent in the selection of a "panel of
experts." 1 " Who should make the selection? How can the selection
process be depoliticized? How will it be determined who is an
"expert" regarding the pertinent issues? This litany of questions
highlights the uncertainty surrounding this optioft.
potential danger attendant to this practice whenever the special master provides "the court
expertise in some sophisticated technological or other esoteric subject"; in this instance,
the tnal judge may place undue reliance on the master's expertise. Id. at 419. See also G.
SPENcE, supra note 45, at 270 (questiomng the utility of a court-appointed expert con-
cerming questions shrouded in scientific uncertainty).
"' See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
,40 Providing comprehensible jury instructions fosters rational decision making. See,
e.g., Goodman, Greene, & Loftus, What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRALm 65,
71-72 (Nov. 1985), where the commentators highlight the difficulty that some jurors
experienced in understanding voluminous jury instructions arising from an I l-week asbestos
case. Certainly, such bewildering jury instructions exacerbate the problems attending the
adjudication of complex products liability cases. See also Note, Improving Jury Compre-
hension in Complex Civil Litigation, 62 ST. JoHN's L. REv 549, 550 (1988) (suggesting a
number of methods to improve the existing system: ordering the issues for trial, conducting
the evidentiary portion of a trial, determimng the form of the jury verdict).
1', This does not differ substantially from a vital function served by the pretrial
conference: trial simplification. See Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OmO ST.
L.J. 163, 164 (1956); Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding A Case From Filing to Disposition, 69 CAns. L. Rav. 770, 785 (1981) ("can
easily save litigants and the court time and money").
142 Clark, supra note 141, at 164.
141 A "panel of experts" could serve the role traditionally performed by lay jurors.
1,4 See Bazelon, supra note 89, at 827-28 (illustrating the difficulty in selecting experts
for qualitative scientific issues).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Perhaps advocates of reform should emulate some existing
practices in selecting an "expert panel" to be fact finders in
complex litigation. For example, in a volurmnous asbestos litiga-
tion, a federal district court in the Southern District of Ohio used
a special panel to screen asbestosis claims stemming from the
inhalation of asbestos. The panel's primary function was to deter-
mine which claims had the requisite causal nexus. Those claims
that failed to reflect such causal connection were dismissed by the
court. 1
45
An interesting feature of the screening panel was the manner
in which its members were selected. Under the federal district
court's plan, one panel member was chosen by the plaintiff, one
by the defendant, and the third member by the court. 14 Presum-
ably, the reason for this particular selection method was to en-
hance the likelihood of choosing a fair and impartial panel.
Moreover, from a political perspective, this process most likely
appealed to a broad range of political persuasions. 147 As a result,
strong political opposition to the panel was probably averted.
The foregoing mechanism should be easily applicable to com-
plex design cases. A "panel of experts" could be chosen in a
politically neutral fashion without compromising competence. Such
a panel could be invaluable in resolving arcane technical issues
associated with a complex design case. Concerns about bias, po-
litical or otherwise, could be ameliorated and perhaps obviated.
Additionally, a fair and rational determination of the complex
issues would be more likely. The commonly expressed argument
that a "panel of experts" may usurp the traditional function of a
court is not convincing, given the number of diverse selection
methods available. 14 By selecting experts from different profes-
sional and political backgrounds, the ability to maintain judicial
control over the panel should be greatly enhanced. Perhaps this
selection technique typifies a beneficial side of the "divide and
conquer" philosophy 149
,41 Expert Panels Established in Asbestos Cases, The Cincinnati Enquirer, Jan. 9,
1987, at C-3, col. 1.
146 Id.
" At a bare minimum, both industnal and consumer perspectives are involved in
such an arrangement. Accommodating these two points of view should minimize any
political haggling.
141 Diversifying the panel of experts makes it less likely that any coalition will usurp
the traditional functions of a court.
141 Normally, the "divide and conquer" philosophy carries a negative connotation.
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b. The Conservative Approach
The "conservative" approach involves less manipulation of
the current system and considers a less drastic modification of the
existing jury trial mechanism as a more prudent course of action.
Under this approach, the burden of insuring that complex issues
are within the competence and understanding of a jury rests solely
with the trial judge and trial attorneys. 150 First, a trial judge's
responsibilities can be accomplished by carefully drawn jury in-
structions that simplify complex issues. Drafting jury instructions
is a principal judicial responsibility in civil litigation, but it is a
particularly important task in complex civil litigation. 51 Addition-
ally, by exercising the power to direct a verdict or to grant a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a judge can take
a case from a jury if, in the court's estimation, it is clearly too
complex to allow a fair and rational decision.12 These tools are
proven methods to reduce possible confusion without eroding the
venerable right to trial by jury in civil cases. Some commentators
argue that once the erosion of the right to trial by jury becomes
firmly established, the exceptions will eventually swallow the gen-
eral rule, spelling the ultimate demise of the right to jury trial in
civil cases.'
Second, trial attorneys can lessen the complexity by developing
clear, cogent evidentiary presentations and arguments. Perhaps
nothing is more illuminating to a jury than well-focused, organized
arguments. 54 Additionally, attorneys can further the jury's under-
standing by contributing to the drafting of jury instructions. Pro-
posing explicit jury instructions not only furthers the trial, but
assists in making a record for appeal. 5 This is important because
That is, by drawing the parties apart, they can more likely be overwhelmed. But in this
Article's proposal such approach may actually have a salutary effect.
I" Spiegel, supra note 54, at 22.
15 Well-crafted jury instructions may increase a jury's appreciation of the intricate
questions inherent in complex design litigation.
112 Judges have typically insured the fair and accurate outcome of a trial by the use
of post trial procedural safeguards. See Note, supra note 89, at 726-27 ("safeguards
include directed verdicts, judgments notwithstanding the verdict, and the ordenng of a
new trial").
133 The greatest dangers to liberty lurk m insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well meaning, but without understanding.
Spiegel, supra note 54, at 22 (quoting Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 479 (1928)).
114 This is generally true in product design cases where the standards, particularly for
defectiveness, are extremely vague. W KEETON, supra note I, at 186.
"5I See Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky. 1980).
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erroneous jury instructions occasionally do constitute reversible
error 116 Thus, from a trial advocacy perspective, it behooves an
attorney to assist in eliminating the complexity, and the resulting
confusion, inherent in product design cases.
The conservative approach favors an improvement of the ex-
isting jury trial guarantee in civil cases instead of its wholesale
modification or abandonment. 157 A definite virtue of such a pro-
posal is that it builds on a system steeped in constitutional history
and practical politics. Moreover, the proposed modifications are
consistent with the generally accepted powers and responsibilities
of judges and attorneys in trial litigation. The conservative pro-
posal seems less radical than many of those included within the
"erosion principle." But can it accomplish the desired objectives?
The attainment of this approach's objectives depends mainly
on how well it will operate within the existing adversarial system.
If the primary objective of the adversarial system is to arrive at
the truth, perhaps attorneys will be more willing to elucidate the
techmcal evidence to simplify these issues for the jury 158 On the
other hand, if revealing the truth is not the primary concern of
the system, then it is doubtful that there will be a strong desire
to facilitate understanding by the jury. 15 9 Instead, there may be
some sense of urgency to obfuscate the issues. 160 In this event,
very little, if any, faith should be placed in trial attorneys to
provide the necessary corrective action in complex civil cases.
The thought that trial judges can make extremely complex
cases more manageable may have some validity irrespective of the
underlying purposes of the adversarial system. The umque position
that judges occupy in a trial probably substantiates this contention
more than anything else. Judges, in theory, preside over a trial to
"I Id. (In a strict tort design case, an instruction reflecting the consumer expectancy
test of defectivenss was deemed to constitute reversible error. An appropriate jury instruc-
tion would have defined unreasonably dangerous in terms of risk-benefit analysis.).
"I See Spiegel, supra note 54, at 22.
I'8 As a policy matter, there has been a longstanding debate over the primary objective
of the judicial system. That is, does it seek truth, or does it secure justice through the
adversarial process? See Wessel, Forum: Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Socios-
czentific Dispute, I J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (1986) ("the judicial system seeks to provide justice.
Justice is not always the same as the scientific truth of a matter").
259 If there were no perceived virtue in truth, then few litigators would actually pursue
it. Instead, being the prevailing party would assume a higher level of prominence. Id. at
5 ("Truth is, of course, a goal of the judicial system, but it is only one goal, and rarely
the main one.").
'6 If obfuscation often triumphs, then a rational litigator is likely to pursue it.
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insure that justice and fairness are meted out evenhandedly 161
Concern about the preeminence of truth as a necessary product
of the adversarial process is, therefore, more likely within the
judges' concerns.1 62 Thus, drafting jury instructions that shed light
on the meaning of techmcal and scientific evidence seems consis-
tent with a judge's role in facilitating the jury's understanding. 63
But how will judges acquire the expertise to do this?
It is doubtful that judges are sophisticated enough to handle
these intricate issues. In fact, it is common knowledge that judges
generally have not displayed the facility to integrate law and
science. 64 Perhaps this will not be true in succeeding years if the
gap between law and science continues to narrow 165 In fact, one
commentator surmises that this process has begun.166 But bridging
the gap between law and science remains basically an aspiration;
a judge, therefore, will often face formidable odds in meeting this
challenge. Thus, it may simply be a classic case of wishful thinking
to argue that the existing civil jury trial system can function with
only minor changes. Relying on trial attorneys and trial judges to
correct the system's inability to deal with complex product design
issues reflects a naive understanding of the magnitude of the
problem in coping with the scientific and technical nuances asso-
ciated with complex product design litigation. 67
It seems unfair to generalize that, "if there be a justifiable
criticism of our jury system, it should be laid at the doorsteps of
our educational institutions for not preparing our future judges
and lawyers for the tasks they will face in the future."'' 68 Instead,
"I But see G. SPENCE, supra note 45, at 109 (suggesting that only a few judges have
refused to sacrifice justice "at the altar of Power").
"2 But some judges have occasionally engaged in outlawry to promote the phenom-
enon of "homecooking." See R. NEELY, Tm PRODUCT LA.BrrY MEss: How BusINEss
CAN BE REsCuED FROM T E PoLITIcs OF STATE CoURTs 75 (1988) ("in many other areas
of the law where thereis no nationally imposed unity, state judges are victimized by the
competitive race to the bottom by being forced to do things that they know are wrong
both from the perspective of sound national and sound state policy").
1,' The primary purpose of a trial judge's instruction to the jury is to heighten the
fact-finder's understanding of the factual issues of the case.
I6 See, e.g., Rosenblum, Legal Education and Professionalism, The President-Elect's
Address, Association of American Law Schools (No. 87-1), Jan. 1987, at 12 (on "the need
to develop legal standards for utilizing contributions of the sciences").
6' See Goldberg, supra note 92, at 1379.
'" Id. /
267 Lawyers, for example, must generally acquire the services of expert witnesses in
complex design cases at a significant cost. To be sure, this frequently leads to costly,
inefficient litigation.
-" See Spiegel, supra note 54, at 22.
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any deficiency is probably inherent in the system's use of fact-
finders who are incapable of fairly and rationally deciding the
complex questions that frequently abound in product design liti-
gation. 169 The answer-does not lie in simply improving the conven-
tional jury system pursuant to the "conservative" approach.
Instead, more drastic reform measures may be necessary
IV. A REFORM PLAN
A. The Basic Outline
Reform simply for the sake of reform is generally misguided. 170
Thus, any drastic modification of the existing jury trial system
should probably be undertaken only as a last resort. This is
especially true in view of the constitutional underpinnngs-both
federal and state-of the right to jury trial m civil cases.17 1 More-
over, juries, in theory, represent the views of a cross section of
the community; as a result, their decisions may reflect community
ideals of justice and fairness. 72
In response to concerns about the possible lack of fairness and
rationality in jury decisions, it has been postulated that a jury
enjoys the unique "right" to deviate from the clear dictates of
the law to reflect the conscience of the community regarding
fairness and justice.173 It is doubtful that such a bald assertion
enjoys any legal legitimacy, although some contend this has been
practiced sub silentio for years. 74 An improper practice cannot be
miraculously transformed into a permissible one by virtue of cus-
"69 Certainly, the general lack of capable fact-finders significantly undermines the due
process underpinnings of a complex design case. Note, Unfit for Jury Determination:
Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C.L.
REv 511, 533 (1979) ("it seems absurd to delegate the task of factfinding in complex
cases to a decision making body of dubious competence").
170 Hams, Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There Any Hope of
Reconciliation?, 40 Sw. L.J. 909, 950 (1986).
'7' See supra notes 8-41 and accompanying text.
72 See Crook, supra note 6, at 1599 ("civil jury trial further contributes to the judicial
system by providing a umque platform for a contemporaneous expression of community
values").
217 See G. SPENCE, supra note 45, at 90-91 ("the old principle of jury nullification
had worked just as the Founding Fathers had intended").
'14 In torts, for example, juries reportedly invoked comparative negligence principles
long before the general repudiation of the common law contributory negligence rule. W
PROSSER, J. WADE, & V SCHWARZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 566 (8th ed. 1988)
[hereinafter PROSSER & SCHWARTZ].
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tomary adherence over time. In tort law common prudence is not
necessarily reasonable prudence. 175 It seems unreasonable to allow
the fact-finding process in complex design cases to be subverted
by a flawed, albeit common, practice.
B. What Reform Plan Will Succeed?
Any reform effort may be subject to attack by those wedded
to the existing jury system. Moreover, as previously noted, the
right to trial by jury in civil cases enjoys the imprimatur of both
the federal and state constitutions.17 6 To think that such a firmly
entrenched guarantee will be easily surrendered is extremely naive.
In view of the formidable challenge of successfully advocating
an alternative to the venerable jury trial guarantee in civil cases,
a reformer must present a compelling, reasoned analysis to justify
any modification. The paralysis spawned by many years of ac-
cepted practice cannot be easily overcome. 177 This rings particularly
true for a right that goes to the core of American jurisprudence.178
Thus, advocating a radical reform of the conventional right to
trial-by jury in civil cases perhaps smacks of temerity
C. The Reform Proposal
The principal thesis of the reform .proposal is that ordinary
jurors do not possess the requisite competence and knowledge to
decide fairly and rationally complex issues emanating from product
design cases. Tis view is not a broad, general condemnation of
the right to trial by jury, but simply a frank acknowledgment of
17, See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) ("[w]hat usually is
done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought.to be done is fixed by
a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not") (quoting
Wabash Ry. Co. v. McDamels, 107 U.S. 454 (1882)).
176 See supra note 8-41 and accompanying text.
I" This phenomenon is currently reflected in the debate surrounding the use of
alternative dispute resolution in medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., Malpractice Plan
Angers Trial Bar, 2 WASH. LAW 17 (March/April 1988) (lawyers critical of a plan of "the
American Medical Association (AMA) that would take malpractice cases out of the courts
and put them in the hands of a specially created state panel"). In connection with motor
vehicle defect disputes, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld the constitutionality of
the New York Lemon Law, which mandates private arbitration of such claims at the
consumer's option. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. New York, 550 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1990).
17' See supra notes 8-41, for a discussion of the longstanding importance of trial by
jury in civil cases.
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the limitations of the existing fact-finding process in resolving com-
plex techical and scientific issues. 79
The expert jury is probably the most feasible method to elimi-
nate the mystery surrounding complex product design cases. 80 Some
built-in mechanism to insure that the search for fair and rational
decision making does not unduly disrupt the delicate balance within
the courtroom must exist.' ' A balance must be struck between
increased efficiency and equity on the part of the fact-finder and
the trial judge's ability to control adequately the processes leading
to the fact-finder's decision. With respect to the trial judge's exer-
cise of control, the pertinent issues relate to 1) the selection of the
expert jury, 2) the management of the evidence presented, and 3)
the content of the jury instructions.
1. Selecting the Expert Jury
The perception that an expert jury will somehow seize control
of the litigation is frequently expressed as a basis for rejecting the
use of such a jury to resolve difficult law and science issues inherent
in product design litigation. 82 The principal reason for this concern
is that the jurors' superior knowledge of highly scientific and tech-
mcal matters may greatly exceed the judge's, thus creating an
unbalance between the court and the jury in the management of
the trial."3 This apprehension is not necessarily groundless given
'79 Detractors of the jury trial system in civil litigation have readily highlighted its
deficiency as a fact-finding tool in a wide range of cases. A graphic illustration of such
harsh criticism, attributable to Carl Becker, reads as follows;
Trial by jury, as a method of determimng facts, is antiquated and
inherently absurd-so much so that no lawyer, judge, scholar, prescription-
clerk, cook, or mechamc in a garage would ever think for a moment of
employing that method for deternming the facts in any situation that con-
cerned him.
In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 429 n.66 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 929 (1980) (quoting J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 124 (1949)).
11o The expert jury should further both efficiency (less cumbersome, costly adjudica-
tions) and equity (more rational, impartial decisions) and, to that extent, may exceed a
nucroeconomist's wildest expectations. See, e.g., A. PouMisY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONoMcs 7 (1983) ("[olne important question is whether there is a conflict between
the pursuit of efficiency and the pursuit of equity").
"I A paramount concern is that an expert jury will somehow seize control of a trial
to a degree previously unheard of, thus distorting the trial process. See Bazelon, supra
note 89, at 828 (attributing the same risk to the participation of an expert advisor).
18 Id.
193 Id.
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recent litigation in which trial judges have demonstrated that inte-
grating law and science is not their forte.'4 But this risk can be
avoided by the careful selection of an expert jury.
Here again, the selection method should mirror the one used in
asbestos litigation in the federal district court for the Southern
District of Ohio.'8 5 Judge Carl Rubm used screemng panels drawn
from the defendant (industry), the plaintiff, and the court to deter-
nune which claimants' injuries actually resulted from exposure to
asbestos. 8 6 Such a process is likely to lead to the selection of a
balanced fact-finding body This is not to say that an impartial
body will result in every instance, but any unfair advantage to a
given party is improbable. Dimnishing the likelihood of coalitional
monopolies in the decisionmakng process should bolster the trial
judge's ability to maintain control of the proceedings.'8
In selecting the expert jury, the unmediately affected interests-
industry and the injured plamtiff-should be asked to nominate
individuals who possess expertise regarding the particular design
issue. From this pool, a panel can be drawn after voir dire con-
ducted by either the judge, the attorneys, or both. Any challenges
to a prospective juror should be restricted to those "for cause" on
the basis of background information which reflects that such juror
will be unable to assess the evidence in a fair and impartial man-
ner. 88 Since the proposal's primary objective is to arrive at a fair
and rational decision, eliminating peremptory challenges should not
frustrate this purpose. 89
2. Managing the Evidence Presented
In complex civil litigation, a basic problem centers around the
admissibility of items of evidence, both testimomal and documen-
I" See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga.
1985), aff'd as to liability, modified as to damages, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
lB See Expert Panels Established in Asbestos Cases, supra note 156.
'"Id.
" See R. NEELY, supra note 162, at 112-13, discussing the possibility that coalitional
monopolies may seize free markets. By analogy, such monopolies may stifle the litigation
process as well.
In "For cause" challenges lustoncally have been used to exclude potentially biased
jurors. The bases for such challenges are normally established during voir dire. See N.
Miller, Winning Jurors' Hearts and Minds, THE Docxr 4-5 (1989).
"9 Certainly, peremptory challenges have been used to remove unqualified prospective
jurors from the tnal process. But it may be unnecessarily duplicative to maintain them
along with challenges "for cause."
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tary Such evidence relates normally to very esoteric matters. Un-
derstanding the substantive content of such evidence, much less the
evidentiary questions surrounding it, places some strain upon the
civil justice system. 190
The primary objective of the rules of evidence is to insure that
only competent evidence whose probative value outweighs its pos-
sible prejudicial effect is considered by the trier of fact.191 This is
the essence of due process. In an ordinary case involving a lay jury
as the fact-finder, the application of the rules of evidence is vital
to a fair and rational determination.19
In cases involving intricate evidentiary matters, genuine ques-
tions about accuracy, justice, and fairness still exist. Although the
problem may be ameliorated by empaneling expert jurors, profound
questions still remain. For example, a judge still has to make a
threshold determnation of the admissibility of such evidence.193 To
conclude that an unsophisticated judge can make rational rulings
about such matters without the aid of an expert is wishful think-
ing. 194
Determining the admissibility of testimonial, documentary, and
even demonstrative evidence relating to highly technical and scien-
tific matters can be extremely complicated. 95 As a result, the process
of fair and impartial adjudication can be facilitated by the use of
an expert advisor to provide advisory assistance to the trial judge.'9
190 A common evidentiary problem in complex product design litigation relates to
what an expert can testify. For example, can an expert witness voice an opimon about the
ultimate issue in the case? For years, courts struggled with this issue before it was finally
resolved. See FED. R. Evm. 704 (expert can state an opinion on the ultimate issue).
"I See FED. R. Evm. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ").
192 The judicious application of the rules of evidence shields the fact-finder from
either incompetent or unduly prejudicial evidence that may distort the fact-finding process.
For a general discussion of the dynamics of this process, see E. CLARY, McCoiocK ON
EvDENCE § 185 (3d ed. 1984).
11) See W PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 236 (5th ed. 1984).
"1 See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga.
1985), aff'd as to liability, modified as to damages, 788 F.2d 741, 744-45 (1lth Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 437 (1986) (spernmicide case in which trial judge accepted the plaintiff's
expert testimony primarily on the basis of witnesses' demeanor). An expert advisor could
probably have prevented such an uninformed judicial decision.
'91 See E. CARLY, supra note 192, at § 203 ("[t]o deal effectively with scientific
evidence, the attorney must know more than the rules of evidence. He must know some-
thing of the scientific principles as well").
1' The expert advisor could illumnnate the technical evidence to demonstrate its
relevancy. Improving the quality of such determinations allows a court to better decide
the bare minmum element of admissibility: relevancy. See M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 623 (1972).
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It should be underscored that the expert's opinion will be advisory
only; the ultimate decision on the admissibility of evidence will rest
with the judge. 19 Undoubtedly the judge will give some deference
to an advisor's technical opinion, but the integrity of the fact-
finding process will be preserved by reservmg the power to rule on
the admissibility of evidence in the trial judge.
Although fears that this proposal may allow expert advisors to
become surrogate judges should not be treated cavalierly, no ap-
parent reason exists to doubt seriously the likelihood of a successful
interaction between a judge and a technical expert. Moreover, any
risks are outweighed by the benefits derived from a fair and im-
partial determination of complex issues. Thus, the benefits over-
shadow the risks.198
3. Giving Jury Instructions
A judge can assert some control over the jury by instructing
them on the law of the case. In many instances, such jury instruc-
tions are usually so mundane that they are reduced to "model"
forms. 19 But in complex design litigation, "model" jury instruc-
tions are rare.2° In complex design cases, considerable thought must
be given to drafting instructions that are precise, accurate, and
reasonably clear.
To integrate applicable scientific principles into jury instruc-
tions, a trial judge must rely upon the special knowledge of an
expert advisor.20' The expert's understanding of scientific method-
ology should be exceedingly helpful in drafting mstructions.m For
example, an expert advisor could prevent a judge or jury from
giving unwarranted credence to disreputable scientific evidence. This
"1 See E. CLEARY, supra note 192, at § 51.
M See W PROSSER, supra note 193, at 171. In negligence actions, the pivotal question
is "whether 'the game is worth the candle,"' (quoting REsTATEmNrr (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
291 comment a) or, stated differently, do the advantages of an activity outweigh the
disadvantages?
9 See, e.g., Ant. MODEL JuRY INSTRUCTIONS (Cir) 2D (1974).
It is extremely difficult, for example, to formulate an instruction on the legal
meaning of defectiveness in design cases. PROSSER & SCHWARTz, supra note 174, at 727.
2* See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
2 The value of illuminating jury instructions in complex cases was underscored by
the Ninth Circuit in the following manner: "Jurors, if properly instructed and treated with
deserved respect, bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and dedication to their tasks, which
is rarely equalled in other areas of public service." In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig.,
609 F.2d at 430, quoted in Schwarzer, supra note 131, at 759.
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would be a vast improvement over the existing civil justice system." 3
Fears that an expert advisor will usurp the trial judge's power
seem unfounded given the judge's ultimate power to control the
substantive content of jury instructions.2" Such an advisor could
provide invaluable guidance without unduly undermining the fun-
damental integrity and balance of the fact-finding process. A net
benefit would accrue to the civil justice system. An expert advisor
to the judge and an expert fact-finder may provide the optimal
chance for fair and rational decision making in complex design
litigation.
In sum, this reform proposal provides adequate safeguards
against an imbalance among the trial judge, the expert advisor, and
the expert jury that might be harmful to the civil justice system.
Under this proposal, the judge retains virtually unfettered control
over the adjudicative process. The experts will simply facilitate the
process; they will neither undermine nor, more significantly, seize
control of it.m Additionally, allowing an expert jury to decide the
facts, pursuant to carefully crafted jury instructions, seems an
efficient and equitable method of decision making. This is surely
within the letter and the spirit of the adjudication model of the
existing civil justice system. Allowing experts to decide complex
scientific factual issues and to provide advisory assistance to the
judge regarding esoteric questions of law and science makes good
sense. Certainly, the compelling benefits attending this proposal
outweigh the unavoidable costs and argue for its serious consider-
ation and perhaps ultimate adoption.
V RECONCILING THIs REFORM PROPOSAL WITH EXISTING JURY
TIAL GUARANTEEs
A. The Argument for Reconcilable Differences
Careful consideration must be given to developing a harmo-
mous relationship between the reform proposal and the traditional
See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d at 744-45.
20 A judge may control the trial with carefully crafted jury instructions. See, e.g.,
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) (an environmental tort case
arising from the contamination of potable water supplies involving the primary issue of
whether a causal nexus existed between the defendant's activities and the contamination
of the plaintiff's wells). A cunous twist in this case was the ultimate holding that it was
not riversible error for the trial judge to fail to give a jury instruction on causation in
fact, ostensibly the key issue in the case.
2 The existing litigation process will more likely endure when supplemented by expert
advisors. See, e.g., Leventhal, supra note 114, at 546-52.
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right to jury trial in civil cases. To the extent this can be accom-
plished, the prospects for acceptance of reform should markedly
increase. Several arguments are advanced in this section of the
Article about how to achieve this coexistence in certain discrete
areas.
1. The Injunction That a Jury Should Represent a Cross
Section of the Community
The proposed use of an expert jury to unravel complex factual
design issues will not necessarily violate the right to jury trial in
civil cases as guaranteed by either the federal Constitution or its
state counterparts. 2° The use of an expert jury may actually foster
the predominant objectives of these various guarantees by achiev-
ing more fairness and rationality in complex design litigation.20 7
A common objection to an expert jury is that such a jury does
not truly represent a cross section of the community 208 But is this
interest necessarily defeated by this reform proposal? Probably
not. For instance, the concept "cross section of the commumty"
is not self-defimng. As a consequence, it cannot be categorically
asserted that this element is incongruous with a proposal that
espouses an expert jury as an informed fact-finder.
Certainly, a jury of experts that is carefully selected by tried
methods will be as representative of a cross section of the com-
munity as a lay jury currently empaneled under existing selection
procedures.2 Not only will such an expert jury be as representa-
tive, but also they will more likely provide a fair and rational
2m The use of special juries in England in 1791 has been cited in support of the
validity and constitutionality of such juries under the United States Constitution and the
individual state constitutions. Thus, special juries fit under the histoncal test for the
determination of the right to a jury trial. See Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English
Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 CoLum. L. REv. 43, 80-82 (1980);
Thatcher, Why Not Use the Special Jury?, 31 M;NN. L. Rav 232, 234-42 (1947); Note,
Court-Sanctioned Means of Improving Jury Competence in Complex Civil Litigation, 24
ARiz. L. Rav. 715, 728 (1982).
2 An expert jury, m theory, should have a greater appreciation of the such complex
issues. Bazelon, supra note 89, at 826-27 ("[s]cientists are umquely competent to address
scientific/factual issues-science is elitist") (emphasis in the original).
- See, e.g., Haas v. United Technologies Corp., 450 A.2d 1173, 1183 (Del. 1982)
("[t]he Supreme Court has reiterated the basic principle that a jury must be drawn from
a pool that is truly representative of a cross-section of the community).
20 Who is to say that a panel of experts will not be as representative of the community
as a lay jury selected by conventional methods? The only possible difference, to be sure,
is that voter registration lists will no longer provide the pool of potential jurors.
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determination because of their superior understanding and appre-
ciation of the scientific and technical issues inherent in a design
case. 210 Because of this significant benefit, any slight deviation
from conventional wisdom about what constitutes a cross section
of the community seems acceptable. This analysis is probably
relevant only to state courts based on interpretation of individual
state constitutions or state statutes. In the federal courts, however,
special or expert juries are probably prohibited by the Federal
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1986. Under this federal statute,
jurors must be "selected at random from a fair cross section of
the community ,211 Thus, any use of a special or expert jury in
federal courts would require legislative amendment of the existing
Act.
2. The Notion That a Jury Reflects the Conscience of the
Community
Some have argued that a jury may deviate from the letter of
the law if such action is dictated by notions of justice and fair-
ness.212 This sort of "jury nullification" is tolerated in our civil
justice system. 213 Assuming this is a desirable feature of a system
that metes out justice in an ad hoc fashion, there is no reason to
believe that it would be incompatible with an expert jury system.
What may be needed is to enlighten these experts about the social
policy ramifications of their scientific decisions2 4 to insure that
210 Again, enhanced knowledge should facilitate decision-making in complex design
issues. That is, an informed fact-finder is more likely to make a factual determination
that comes within the pale of acceptable scientific accuracy. See Task Force of the
Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, The
Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 Sci. 653 (1976) (extolling this fact-
finding feature of the Science Court).
2 See Note, Court-Sanctioned Means of Improving Jury Competence in Complex
Civil Litigation, 24 ARiz. L. REv 715, 729 (1982) (commenting upon the probable pro-
hibitory effect of the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874
(1982 & Supp. 1986)) and urging Congress to pass new legislation in recognition of the
need for special juries in complex civil litigation).
212 See, e.g., G. SPENCE, supra note 45, at 90-91 (suggesting that a jury's right to
deviate from the law is consistent with the framers' view of justice).
21 Here again, this was manifested whenever the jury was instructed by the court
that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery; instead, many
juries seemed to apportion liability between the parties on the basis of their comparative
fault or responsibility. This reflects the ameliorative device of making contributory negli-
gence a jury question. PROSSER & SciwARTz, supra note 174, at 566.
214 See Goldberg, supra note 92, at 1385 ("the best scientists in the future must master
policy issues. ").
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fairness and justice will never be routinely sacrificed on the altar
of inflexible scientific decision making.
With proper indoctrination, an expert jury can reflect the
conscience of the community. More importantly, such a jury will
probably dole out "justice" in a basically evenhanded manner
because of their ability to avoid confusion by complex scientific
data.215 In the final analysis, a more accurate determination guided
by notions of fairness and justice seems inevitable.
3. The Guarantees of the Right to Jury Trial in Civil Cases.
The right to jury trial in civil cases has its genesis in both the
federal' Constitution's seventh amendment and the various state
constitutions. 2 6 As a general rule, this right exists in actions at
law Consequently, products liability design cases merit jury trial
treatment.217 Does an expert jury comport with these guarantees?
As previously noted, the jury trial guarantee in England in
1791 is the barometer, at least for seventh amendment analysis,
of the precise contours of the right to jury trial in civil cases .21
Does this proposal for an expert jury fit within this mold? Upon
close examination, a strong argument can be made that it does
because special juries existed at English common law in 1791.
This, therefore, meets the "historical" test for preserving the right
to trial by special juries in complex civil cases. 21 9
In a similar vein, a primary objective of the framers was to
create a fact-finding mechanism capable of consistently arriving
at a fair and rational determination. 220 Implicit in this is the
21, Jury confusion with regard to expert testimony and complex jury instructions
permeates the design litigation process. Goodman, Greene, & Laftus, What Confuses Jurors
in Complex Cases, TxuL 65, 65 (Nov. 1985).
216 See supra notes 8-41 and accompanying text.
217 Products liability actions sound at law. Such actions are frequently hybrid in
nature and personify the melding of contract and tort. Warranty actions, for example,
represent the classic intersection of contract and tort. See 1 0. HAmu & A. SQuiANTE,
supra note 67, at xi.
218 Wilkinson, Zielinski, & Curtis, supra note 105, at 68 ("the constitution's framers
intended to preserve the right to jury trial for all cases at English common law for which
such a right existed in 1791, the year the amendment was adopted") (citation omitted).
219 Thatcher, supra note 206, at 248-49. To be sure, it seems that the use of special
juries has historical justification under both the Seventh Amendment and many of its state
counterparts.
The framers probably wanted to insure that due process guarantees would inhere
in civil trial procedures. This desire is reflected in "the due process considerations of the
fifth amendment." Note, supra note 89, at 715.
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requirement as a matter of procedural due process, that a fact-
finder be able to grasp fully the issues presented during a trial.'22
Certainly, some of the intricate issues inherent in complex design
cases defy reasoned analysis by an ordinary juror.tm
It seems appropriate to offer a fact-finding process that pro-
motes the sensible resolution of the complex questions associated
with product design -litigation. This result would be particularly
fitting if it could be achieved without unduly eroding the principles
underlying the jury trial guarantee. The expert jury proposal may
actually attain this result.
Potential risks associated with this proposal exist. Some risks
are inevitably attendant to a different approach to fact-finding.2
But the query is whether the benefits to be derived outweigh the
risks. In this instance, the risks of insensitivity to the policy
impulses of scientific analysis, of bias in. the selection of jury
members, and of the scientific aura surrounding an expert jury's
determination, which may stifle further research, are all recogmz-
able. But these risks may be either reduced or avoided by the
mechamsms built into the proposal or may be.actually overshad-
owed by the benefits derived from it. The expert jury system will
be a cost-effective way to decide such issues. And this supports
its adoption as a modification to the existing jury system in both
state and federal courts.2
There is nothing in historical precedent nor public policy to
warrant the uncritical acceptance of the existing jury system as
the sole method to adjudicate complex product design cases. To
the contrary, a change in the times and the concomitant public
policy considerations favor some dramatic- modifications. The re-
form proposal presented in this Article fulfills this need while
221 Id.
2n The concept of "defectiveness" in complex product design cases presents several
problems. Courts have, for instance, floundered about in attempting to develop discrete
tests for defectiveness in both negligent and strict tort design cases. D. FIsciHR & W
POWERS, JR., PRODUCT LLmn.rry-CAsEs AND MATEPALs 57-58 (1988).
For example, the special expert jury may present problems in terms of the expertise
of its members as well as their natural prejudices. See Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., No.
70834, slip op. at 7 (Del. Super. May 23, 1989) (WESTLAW, State directory, Del. file).
But, here again, these are not insuperable barriers to implementation. And, in view of the
unavoidable risks associated with any deviation from the norm, the apposite inquiry is
"[w]hen are these risks worth taking?" McGovern, supra note 134, at 491.
- As noted earlier, the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act would have to be
amended to allow special or expert juries in federal courts. See supra note 211. Congress,
to be sure, should enact such an amendment in the interest of fair and rational decision
making in complex civil litigation.
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meeting constitutional mandates concerning the right to jury trial
in civil cases.
CONCLUSION
It is perhaps naive to assert dogmatically that the existing jury
system is well-suited to handle complex product design cases. It
is, moreover, extremely simplistic to contend that any problems
in this system can be elinunated without significant reform. The
crux of the problem is certainly the vast amount of scientific and
technical complexity surrounding product design cases. In many
cases, the level of intricacy may exceed the capacity of the ordinary
jury In such instances, fair and rational decisionmaking is prob-
ably an illusion.
An expert jury, combined with an expert advisor to the trial
judge, is a reasonable alternative 'to the existing civil justice system.
From this combination, a decisionmaking process should arise that
comports with due process without subverting the constitutional
right to jury trial in civil cases. Thus, the solution to the conun-
drum of reaching a rational and impartial determination in com-
plex product design cases lies in striking such a balance. The
proposal presented in this Article should achieve this feat, thus
making the fact-finding process in complex product design litiga-
tion more consonant with the peculiar demands for fairness and
justice of the 1990s and beyond. Such proposed reform should
insure the reasonable survival of an integral component of the
civil justice system, the right to trial by jury
1990-91]

